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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Education is obtained during a long process of personal maturation and the
accumulation of knowledge and abilities. Hence, formal schooling is a learning
and investment process that often lasts into one’s mid twenties. When a young
person makes plans for the future one of the biggest problems is uncertainty.
The success of a long education is as uncertain as the process of earning in-
come during a long working life. As time goes on, students repeatedly consider
whether to continue their education or enter the labor market. During this se-
quential process of decision making1 each moment’s conditions determine the
eventual attainment level.
Recent literature shows that real option theory can be applied to take into
account uncertain time processes and irreversibility in schooling and human
capital accumulation decisions. Hogan and Walker (2007) and Jacobs (2007)
pick up these ideas in diﬀerent ways and show that introducing real option
theory can generate new insights in the idea of education as an investment
decision in human capital.
The ﬁrst analysis of investment in human capital under uncertainty was
conducted by Levhari and Weiss (1974). Levhari and Weiss model risky future
earnings in a two-period approach of human capital formation, concluding that
an increase in uncertainty regarding the return on human capital investment de-
creases the level of investment under given assumptions about risk preferences
and risk-return technology. This paper remains a major benchmark. Later,
e.g. Eaton and Rosen (1980) extended this framework to analyse tax eﬀects.
Dynamic techniques combined with portfolio theory have also gained consider-
able attention. Williams (1978) examined risky investment in education using a
two-period, mean-variance portfolio model. Considering several sources of risk,
Williams was able to derive more precise hypotheses about observable variables
than Levhari and Weiss (1974). Groot and Oosterbeek (1992) discussed the
eﬀects of uncertain future earnings and the probability of unemployment on the
duration of schooling. Hanchane, Lioui and Touahri (2006) developed a contin-
uous time dynamic programming model which accounts for several sources of
uncertainty with regard to earnings and labor market conditions. They showed
that the global eﬀect of uncertainty is negative, except when a suﬃciently high
risk premium exists.
The application of real options theory to the human capital investment de-
cision is a relatively recent development. Even if Weisbrod (1962) and more for-
mally Comay, Melnik, Pollatschek (1973) suggested the idea more than 30 years
ago, a transfer of formal option theory - as established by Dixit and Pindyck
(1994) - was suggested only recently. Hogan and Walker (2007) provide an ex-
ample of this transfer of real option theory to human capital decisions. In their
model, at any time a student has the option to leave school to work for wages
that reﬂect the years spent in school. The decision to leave school is irreversible,
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so once the student has ﬁnished education they cannot return. They conclude
that high returns on education and increasing risk will cause students to stay in
school longer. They also analyze how progressive taxation and education sub-
sidies aﬀect schooling decisions and show that progressive taxes tend to reduce
educational attainment. Jacobs (2007) uses the real option approach as well.
However, unlike Hogan (2007) he uses a discrete time approach and states that
the decision to start learning is irreversible. The option value stems from the
fact that an individual could wait to enrol and would only do so once the returns
are suﬃciently large to compensate for the lost option value. The sunk cost of
the investment consists of forgone labor earnings and tuition costs.
Looking at recent empirical literature on human capital investments there is
evidence that the classical Mincer approach is increasingly unable to suﬃciently
explain the link between earnings, rates of return and educational attainment.2
In line with these ﬁndings is the idea of introducing risk and other non-pecuniary
elements in the empirical model.3 Further, Heckman, Lochner, and Todd (2006)
give reasons why option values should be included in the decision, and show how
option values invalidate the internal rate of return as an investment choice crite-
rion. "Our analysis points to a need for more empirical studies that incorporate
the sequential nature of individual schooling decisions and uncertainty about
education costs and future earnings to help determine their importance. We
report evidence on estimated option values from the recent empirical literature
using rich panel data sources that enable analysts to answer questions that could
not be answered with the cross section data available to Mincer in the 1960s."
[Heckman, Lochner, and Todd (2006) p. 6 ]. However, these ﬁndings encourage
a closer look at the impact of real option theory on human capital investment
decision under uncertainty and extend thee x i s t i n gm o d e l i n gt og e n e r a t eam o r e
comprehensive theoretical framework. the impact of real option theory on
In line with Hogan and Walker (2007) we discuss how uncertain time processes
(stochastic processes) determine the duration of schooling and - with the timing
decision to leave school - the accumulation of human capital. As education is
ac o n t i n u o u sp r o c e s s ,ay e a ro fs c h o o l i n ga l s om e a n say e a r - l o n gd e f e r r a lo ft h e
entry into the labor market. The deferral includes an option to extend school-
ing for another year and to rise to a higher level of academic achievement. This
option for further education is not only a chance to obtain a better expected
income track, it also has an implicit value because the uncertainty of work-
ing life is postponed and the irreversible4 nature of leaving the school system
2Evidence (e.g. Katz, Autor, (1999)) shows that the functional form of the Mincer model
no longer adequately describes labor earnings for U.S. workers. Further Heckman, Lochner,
and Todd (2003, 2006) test and reject the assumptions required to use the Mincer model
to estimate the internal rate of return. Heckman et al. (2008) emphasize that estimates
should account for nonlinearities and non-separabilities in earnings functions, income taxes,
and tuition.
3See e.g. Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro (2005), Carneiro, Hansen, and Heckman (2003),
Belzil, Leonardi (2007a, b) or Hartog, Van Ophem,and Bajdechi, (2007).
4Practical reversability is also possible thanks to the inclusion of instruments such as exitStay in school or start working? October 6, 2009 3
is not realized. However, even if we are in some respects close to Hogan and
Walker (2007), we depart from their analysis in various ways. 1) Hogan and
Walker (2007) do not consider tuition costs or other human capital investment
costs during education. In our approach schooling is linked to investment costs.
Education implies the accumulation of an investment stream over time with
additional years of schooling. 2) Costs may diﬀer depending on the level of
formal qualiﬁcation. That is, we can distinguish between formal qualiﬁcations
and the related costs. 3) In addition to a single Brownian motion we look at
the complete earning proﬁle consisting of the stochastic initial wage level when
entering the labor market (entry-level wage), and the stochastic dynamics of
income during working life. In this model both may be linked to educational
attainment. 4) While Hogan and Walker discussed the threshold reaction for
taxes and uncertainty, we explicitly determine the expected timing of market
entry. Determining the ﬁrst passage time allows us to include current market
conditions like the current no-education wage (minimum wage) etc. in the dis-
cussion. Explicitly looking at the timing of market entry enables us to illustrate
that the human capital decision is a sequential decision in time. Hence, the
duration of schooling responds to all relevant economic variables and current
stochastic market conditions. Looking at the ﬁrst passage time as well as at the
threshold reaction also shows that additional conditions are required to obtain
a solution for the expected time of market entry. In other words, even if we can
determine the threshold and the reaction of the threshold there is no guarantee
this threshold will ever be reached in a more complex model (e.g. when including
accumulative costs). 5) Comparative statics for all relevant variables are fully
discussed analytically. No numerical discussion is needed. 6) As we are able to
look at a sequence of education programs, each characterized by diﬀerent earn-
ing proﬁles, sheepskin eﬀects can be analyzed. 7) Entry into a higher education
program often requires the successful prior completion of a lower qualiﬁcation
level. Hence the option value of an education is not only described by the earn-
ing proﬁle of the education level in question, but also should include the option
value of completing a higher qualiﬁcation later on. This problem is discussed in
the ﬁnal section.
In order to discuss these problems we will proceed as follows. In section 2 we
introduce the real option model to determine the expected time of leaving school
for contiuous schooling. In section 3 we solve the model, and discuss comparative
statics in section 4. In section 5 we extend the model by introducing diﬀerent
levels of formal qualiﬁcation and discuss the implications for the option values.
In section 6 we conclude.
options in the model. However, as we would like to analyze a simple case we postpone this
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2A m o d e l f o r t i m e t o l e a v e s c h o o l
The education decision is an investment in human capital under uncertainty.
Education is a choice of various time tracks of opportunities in an uncertain
future. Investments in schooling and formal qualiﬁc a t i o n so p e nu pt h e s ev a r i -
ous time tracks of opportunities and generate corresponding uncertain income
streams. How many years should a person invest in schooling for a higher formal
qualiﬁcation? What is the expected duration of additional education and skills
development outside of formal schooling programs? When is the best time to
leave school and start working?
Modeling the timing the time of departure from the education system, we
can describe the uncertain future development using various pattern of income
streams depicted by diﬀerent stochastic processes. As soon as working life starts,
the individual will enter an uncertain labor market unaware of the income stream
and the future success of their professional activity. However, they will have
expectations about their income track that are linked to their formal academic
qualiﬁcation. The expected path of a college graduate will diﬀer from that of
someone with a high school diploma.
In this model towards a timing decision to leave school we suggest real op-
tion theory in terms of a dynamic programming model. The individual can defer
their entry into the labor market and obtain more schooling. A student maxi-
mizes their present discounted value of lifetime earnings by deriving an optimal
individual income threshold at which it is favorable to enter the labor market.
Knowing that threshold, we can determine the expected duration of schooling
and the corresponding level of formal academic qualiﬁcation. This timing deci-
sion has two elements: 1) accumulated investment costs of schooling,2 )beneﬁts
of schooling with three components: a) schooling is a determinant of the level
of the earnings path depicted by the entry-level wage when working life starts
and b) schooling aﬀects the d y n a m i cd e v e l o p m e n to ft h ei n c o m es t r e a mand the
resulting value of earnings during working life, and c) postponing working life
through longer education, potentially achieving a better income track, or not
yet being tied to a speciﬁc uncertain earnings stream has its own value, i.e. the
option value of education. While a) and b) are the components of the expected
earning proﬁle, c) evaluates the advantage of remaining ﬂexible.
At any point in time a student may decide to stay in school or to leave the
education system and start working. Based on the expected net earning stream
(including costs) and the option value of additional education, the student deter-
mines a threshold that triggers their decision to leave school and start working.
That threshold is the entry-level wage a student needs to realize in order to
have a positive evaluation of the complete education project. Hence they try to
navigate their education process towards a situation where the realized entry-
level income matches the required income suggested by the threshold. At any
moment the student compares these two values and decides whether it is bene-
ﬁcial to stay at school or start working and collect the expected income linked
to their schooling investment. At any given moment the student reassesses their
expected further education process. As the decision is repeated we observe aStay in school or start working? October 6, 2009 5
sequence of ”stay-in-school decisions” that adds up to the entire duration of
schooling and the eventual level of academic achievement. However, at any mo-
ment sudden (random) changes in conditions can also lead to an unexpected
start of working life resulting in an unexpected lower level of education.
2.1 Investment costs of schooling:
If we deﬁne the time at which an individual decides about schooling as t =
0, total schooling costs for an individual student are the sum of the costs of
each year until the end of their education.5 In this model C is deﬁned as the
individual cost of a successfully completed year of schooling. Hence, a student
with low capabilities would have to spend more to successfully complete a year
of schooling. It can be assumed that these expenditures consist of tuition, extra
private lessons, purchase of books, computers, materials and other related costs.
Total investment expenditure for schooling I(T) is dynamic and increases over
time with each additional year of schooling. At time T, the end of the schooling




Cer(T−t)dt + ¯ C, (1)
where r is the risk-free interest rate and ¯ C are the given costs of successfully
graduating, searching for an adequate job and realizing market entry. To focus
on the major mechanics, taxes are not included in this simplest of models.
However, this can easily be done by correcting the eﬀective interest rate r,t h e
costs of schooling6 and the income streams for taxes.
2.2 Earnings proﬁle
Schooling not only generates costs. Schooling will also lead to a diﬀerent earn-
ing proﬁle. Schooling generates a) a diﬀerential in the entry-level wage when
entering the labor market (move from A to B along the dotted line in ﬁgure 1),
and b) schooling may lead to a change in the dynamic development and risk of
the income stream during working life (dashed line in ﬁgure 1).
Entry-level wage: The entry-level wage, which is the wage when working
life starts deﬁnes the initial level of the income path. Hence, the entry-level
wage is the ﬁrst of two elements of the earnings proﬁle linked to educational
achievement. With each additional (successful) year of schooling the entry-level
wage increases, and hence the level of the earnings stream rises (see the dotted
line in ﬁgure 1).7 However, even if another year of schooling can be expected
5Recent empirical studies suggest that education costs are an important ingredient of the
education decision (see e.g. Heckman (2008)). By including the annual accumulative cost of
schooling we depart from Hogan and Walker (2007), who do not consider education costs.
6If provided schooling costs are tax deductible.
7In ﬁgure 1 we consider the logarithm of income in order to draw income streams as linear
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Figure 1: Earning proﬁle: Entry-level wage and dynamics of income
to generate a marginal increase in entry-level wage by the rate δ, many random
elements determine the wage when entering the labor market. For the present
simple case we describe the development of entry-level wages during schooling
as a Brownian motion
d˜ Y = δ˜ Yd t+ σ˜ Yd W for 0 <t<T. (2)
where σ denotes a constant volatility, dW denotes the increments of a stan-
dard Wiener process, and δ>0 is the expected marginal diﬀerential in income
level with respect to marginal schooling time and educational improvement (ex-
pected rate of market reward). This change in the level of the income path is
part of the total income reward generated by the schooling process. When a
student plans their education at t =0they expect from their market observa-
tion that one year of schooling will give them an entry-level wage of E ˜ Y (T =1 ) .
For a market entry after two years of schooling they would expect an increase
of the entry-level wage to the level E ˜ Y (T =2 ) . As we will later see for a given
dynamic of the income stream, the expected marginal market reward δ and
hence the diﬀerential in the level of the income path must be large8 enough to
compensate suﬃciently for the additional investment costs in human capital C.
8In this simplest of cases δ is ﬁxed and the process is linear. However, a more realistic case
would be δ(T) with a non-linear, maybe even s-shaped marginal reward of additional schooling.
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Dynamics and value of the income stream: The second element of an
individual earning proﬁle is the dynamic development of the lifetime earnings
stream. The dynamics of an individual income track are also connected to
education. From the stylized facts we know that the dynamics of income during
working life diﬀer with respect to years of schooling and formal qualiﬁcation
l e v e l s . W ea s s u m et h a tt h el i f e t i m ee a rning path has systematic and random
elements. Therefore, we model the lifetime earning path as a random process.
Upon entry in the market (t>T) the student faces a stochastic revenue stream
which is characterized by an expected average growth rate α and elements of
uncertainty depicted by a constant volatility σ. In general, individual income
dynamics are driven by a stochastic earning process described by a geometric
Brownian motion
dY = αY dt + σYdW for T<t , (3)
with dW denoting the increments of a standard Wiener process. While in
the real world an earnings proﬁle would not be linear and decrease at the end
of a working life or even become negative, we try to keep matters simple and
assume α to be constant. For simplicity we also assume identical developments
no matter how many years of schooling were completed. At this point neither
do we distinguish between diﬀerent years of schooling or achievement of formal
educational levels such as primary, secondary or tertiary education. Hence in
ﬁgure 1 earning tracks are characterized as parallel processes. In a more realistic
setting we need to distinguish between diﬀerent earning dynamics according to
years of schooling or academic attainment. This will be examined later in this
paper.
Once working life begins, the earning proﬁle is ﬁxed within the limits of the
random process. Hence other opportunities are excluded and the economic value
of the achieved education consists solely of its future income stream. For a risk
neutral individual the gross value of human capital (education wealth) V gross is
given by the expected present value of the wage-income earning stream {Y (t)}






; r>α ,( 4 )
with r being the risk free interest rate. For simplicity the individual has an
inﬁnite lifespan.
2.3 Option value of the waiting:
Apart from aﬀecting the earning proﬁle, education time has a value of the option
to defer market entry in order not to be tied to a lifetime earnings proﬁle with
the corresponding risk and irreversibility.
The option not to start working and not to irreversibly take the risk of em-
barking on a particular earning track has its own value - in correspondence to aStay in school or start working? October 6, 2009 8
ﬁrm’s investment decision (Dixit (1989), and Dixit and Pindyck (1994)). Wait-
ing may open up additional opportunities that could otherwise not have been
foreseen and realized. Waiting also protects individuals from an ”irreversible”
departure from the education track. Once a student has left school they cannot
return and are tied to the income and opportunity track they have chosen. In
reality, this is surely not as strict as suggested by the expression ”irreversible”.9
However, the end of schooling often also marks the end of a period of a personal
life cycle characterized by a particular measure of independence and ﬂexibility.
The entry into working life marks the beginning of a new phase in life that is
often connected to starting a family or acquiring responsibilities that go beyond
the individual themselves. Returning to an education program is not impossi-
ble, but often has fairly high costs. Hence, leaving the system reﬂects the hope
that one’s present educational achievement will pay oﬀ suﬃciently. If these ex-
pectations are not be fulﬁlled the student’s investment costs become sunk costs.
Therefore, waiting has a value because it oﬀers the student ﬂexibility. Further,
once the student has decided to incur the sunk costs and enter the market, they
could generally decide to exit if realized revenues are below expectation. In the
current model, however, we assume that the student cannot exit the market
voluntarily after entering - we thus preclude the exit option and leave it for a
future extension to the present model. Accounting for the option value F for
the Brownian motion (2), the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation holds:
rFdt = E(dF). (5)
This equation indicates that for a time interval dt, the total expected return on
the investment opportunity is equal to the expected rate of capital appreciation.
2.4 Decision problem
For a student the education decision is a timing problem concerning whether to
stay in school or enter the market. In order to clearly state the decision problem
for this market entry we need to determine the net value of education V (for
any education achievement) and compare this value with the option value F.
To determine the expected net value of human capital the expected gross
value (4) has to be adjusted for individual education costs I(T) accumulated
during the time of schooling (1). Hence, the net value of the earning stream of
education investment is
V = V gross − I(T) (6)
In addition to the expected net value of human capital (net wealth of educa-
tion) the third element of the decision problem, the option value of remaining
in the education system, has to be considered. Further, as long as the student
delays market entry they retain the option to enter the market without the risk
of failure and embarking on the wrong earning stream.
9Exit options can be included.Stay in school or start working? October 6, 2009 9
Given the expected net value of the earning stream (6) the option value F of
postponing market entry and obtaining a better qualiﬁcation by adding another
year of schooling can be determined by applying dynamic programming.10 Once
the option value of waiting has been determined, the question of whether or not
to wait for another period will be solved by the solution to:
max{V (T),F(T)} (7)
At any time during their education the student will compare the expected net
value of human capital with the option value of remaining at school and not
realizing an uncertain earning stream by starting work. As long as the option
value of postponing the switch into working life and continuing one’s education
is higher than the value of realizing the uncertain income stream, the student
will opt for another year of schooling. Solving this continuous decision problem
d e t e r m i n e st h et i m eo fe n t r yi n t ot h el a b o rm a r k e ta n dh e n c et h ee x p e c t e dd u -
ration of schooling including the decision about the level of formal qualiﬁcation.
3 Solving for the expected time to leave school
Solving for the expected time of market entry as described above has two steps.
First, for each duration of schooling we need to determine the income value
(Y ∗(T) threshold) that would be needed to start working after a certain duration
of schooling. This threshold is the required entry-level wage and hence the
required level of the income path that would make one’s education proﬁtable.
When the threshold is reached, the value of the earning stream becomes higher
than the option value and hence market entry becomes more proﬁtable than
waiting and obtaining more education. Second, as the threshold would trigger
the start of working life the student simultaneously observes the development
of the relevant entry-level wage ˜ Y (T). The student compares the threshold for
their academic achievement with the corresponding current entry-level wage and
veriﬁes if the threshold has already been reached. Third, if they decide to stay
at school they will predict the expected timing to leave school and hence the
expected duration of schooling. We will model these aspects in the following
section.
3.1 Entry Threshold
In order to determine the income value that triggers the switch we need to
consider the standard conditions of a stochastic dynamic programming problem.
In addition to the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation for the option value F and
applying Ito’s lemma to dF we have to use the well known boundary conditions,
10See the next section.Stay in school or start working? October 6, 2009 10
namely (8),t h evalue matching condition (9),a n dsmooth pasting condition (10)
Fτ (0) = 0, (8)




d(V gross(Y ∗) − I(T))
dY
smooth pasting condition. (10)
to solve for the threshold income Y ∗. The setting of the decision problem
implies that the value of the uncertain earnings stream must be worth the switch
from school to work. Hence, the wage level given by the Brownian motion must
be high enough. Reaching this threshold triggers the change in strategy from
more education towards entering the labor market. Therefore, determining this
optimal threshold is the ﬁrst part of a solution to the expected timing of market
entry problem.
Proposition 1 For a constant accumulation of costs per year of successful
schooling (1), a sequence of increasing earning levels through schooling described
by (2), and an earning dynamics after market entry following (3) we can de-


































Proof. For a proof see Appendix 1a).
Since each additional year of schooling adds to the total costs of education
these costs are dynamic. The investment costs increase with years of schooling.
Therefore, the threshold changes with the duration of schooling T, i.e. the
threshold is a continuous function of T.
From the threshold function Y ∗(T) in Figure 2 we can see that an additional
year of schooling drives up the threshold, that is, the student wants to be com-
pensated for the additional year and costs by a higher entry-level income. In
other words, the student would only complete an addtional year if they expect
to be compensated by the market.
3.2 Expected ﬁrst-time realization of entry-level wages
Once the student knows from the threshold at which entry-level wage they
should start working, the question is when can they expect to obtain this income
from the market for the ﬁrst time.
As described above, the path of the entry-level wage is another random
process. For a year of schooling and the investment costs C the student may ex-
pect not only a diﬀerent earnings dynamic during their working life (describedStay in school or start working? October 6, 2009 11
by (3)). Income upon entry to the labor market is also expected to increase
systematically by rate δ in (2) when time of schooling T increases. As decribed
in ﬁgure 1 both, the income dynamics and the entry-level wage deﬁne the com-
plete earnings proﬁle. That is, whenever a student considers their educational
attainment they have to make a decision based on the time path of the entry-
level wage. As the initial income level is described by a random process and the
threshold triggers market entry we are interested in the expected time when the
threshold is reached for the ﬁrst time referred to as the ﬁrst passage time.A s
the threshold moves in a non linear way, it is hard to analytically determine the
ﬁrst passage time directly by the procedures suggested in Karatzas and Shreve
(1991, p.196) or Karlin and Taylor (1975, p.363).
However, in order to analytically determine the ﬁrst passage time in the
next section we ﬁrst suggest an instrument that allows for a non-linear devel-
opment of the threshold and which leads to an easy graphic illustration. We
call this instrument the Expected First Time Realization of entry-level wages.
That is, for the random process (˜ Y s e e( 2 ) )w ed e r i v et h eexpected time of ﬁrst
realizing a certain entry-level wage ˜ Yi (given today’s value ˜ Y0). By using the
Girsanov theorem we can derive the probability density function of ˜ Ti
11 which
is sometimes referred to as the Inverse Gaussian Distribution12.
Further, as we can determine the expected time of ﬁrst realization of each value
˜ Yi > ˜ Y0 for the interval ˜ Yi ∈]˜ Y0,∞] we can write the expected ﬁrst realization
time as a function of ˜ Yi/˜ Y0 :
Proposition 2 From the Brownian motion (2) we can derive the expected time
of ﬁrst realization E ˜ T of each entry-level wage ˜ Y>˜ Y0, ˜ Y ∈]˜ Y0,∞] as a function
of ˜ Y/˜ Y0, and hence determine the expected time until any entry-level wage ˜ Y is
reached for the ﬁrst time









Proof. For a proof see Appendix 2.
This expected time of ﬁrst realization E ˜ T for all values of entry-level wages can
be drawn as the E ˜ Tc u r v ein ﬁgure 2a.
3.3 Expected time to leave school
Whenever a student plans their career they have to consider the time path of
the entry-level wages and the threshold that will trigger market entry. We are
interested in the expected time the threshold can be reached for the ﬁrst time;
11An extensive discussion is oﬀered by Karatzas and Shreve (1991, p.196) and Karlin and
Taylor (1975, p.363).
12The term ”inverse Gaussian distribution” stems from the inverse relationship between
the cumulant generating functions of these distributions and those of the Gaussian distribu-
tions. For a detailed discussion of the inverse Gaussian distribution see Johnson, Kotz, and
Balakrishnan (1995) or Dixit (1993).Stay in school or start working? October 6, 2009 12
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Figure 2: Threshold and income level
that is, we are interested in the so called ﬁrst passage time (Karatzas and Shreve
(1991, p.196), Karlin and Taylor (1975, p.363)). As decribed in ﬁgure 2a there
are two types information available to determine the ﬁrst passage time and
hence the expected time of market entry. First, the student knows the threshold
Y ∗(T) that triggers market entry for each duration of schooling T.S e c o n d ,
from the properties of the Brownian motion (2) the student knows the expected
ﬁrst-time realization of all inital income values, that is, the time when a certain
entry-level wage ˜ Y is expected to be reached for the ﬁrst time E ˜ T.
Hence, if the entry-level wage ˜ Yi in question is expected to be reached for
the ﬁrst time at E ˜ Ti and if ˜ Yi matches the value of Y ∗(T) at this particular
time (for T = E ˜ Ti), we obtain the ﬁrst passage time T∗.I n o t h e r w o r d s ,
we obtain the expected time of market entry, which is when the entry-level
wage can be expected to match the threshold for the ﬁrst time (intersect of
the expected ﬁrst-time realization of inital income and the threshold in ﬁgure
2a). Correspondingly, as long as the ﬁrst passage time has not been reached
the option value F is larger than the net value of current human capital (ﬁgure
2b)13.
Proposition 3 a) With the threshold Y ∗(T) (see (11)), the expected ﬁrst-time
13As in Dixit and Pindyck ((1994), page 160) the curves F,V-I have an upward slope.
However, under certain conditions they can also decrease because in this model costs are
accumulated. For details see Appendix/Annotation 3.Stay in school or start working? October 6, 2009 13
realization of inital income levels E ˜ T (see (14)), and condition (16) and (17)14
there is an expected time to leave school and start working life T∗ = E(T) >
0 (ﬁrst passage time) b) For each vector (α,r,σ,T∗,C,˜ Y (0),δ, ¯ C) that fulﬁls
a) there is a marginal environment, such that T∗ is an implicit function of
α,σ,C, ˜ Y (0),δ, ¯ C and r.
T∗ = T∗(α,σ,C, ˜ Y (0),δ r) (15)
λ
λ − 1
(r − α) ¯ C>˜ Y (0), (16)
¯ Cr > ¯ C(δ −
1
2
σ2) >C . (17)
Proof. For a proof see Appendix 3.
In ﬁgure 2a, a threshold that is higher than the expected entry-level wage
reﬂects that learning costs during the education phase (before T∗)a r en o ty e t
suﬃciently compensated by the present entry-level wage. Hence the student
will delay entering the market. In addition, condition (16) is important to
understanding the logic of the decision problem.15 The decision in favor of any
education level will only be positive if the minimum wage (no-education income
˜ Y (0))i ss u ﬃciently small compared to education costs (16).16
Further, as randomness is part of reality and random elements are modeled
by a random process, the expected time of market entry (T∗) is just an indicator
of what may actually happen in future. As the future is partly random, an
unexpected departure from education and subsequent market entry can easily
happen at any time. In ﬁgure 2a we draw the time path of the expected ﬁrst-time
realization of entry-level wages for the present state of information at time t0 by
E ˜ T. A moment later, even if the individual expects to enter the market at T ∗,
a random occurrence in the labor market (e.g a business cycle boom) can push
entry-level wages such that the threshold is reached and the student decides
to start working immediately. In ﬁgure 2a this is displayed by the randomly
upward shift of the realized market value at point A0. The observed and hence
realized market earnings exceed the threshold and hence education is terminated
at T =1and not - as expected before - at T∗.I t i s e a s y t o ﬁnd illustrative
examples, such as the unexpected oﬀer of an extraordinarily well-paid job. In
14Condition (17) seems restrictive. However, this suﬃcient condition reﬂects the simplifying
assumption that schooling costs are constant for each year of schooling and the dynamics of
the income process (3) do not change with more years of schooling. If income dynamics
were positively related to the duration of schooling (α(T),α 0 > 0), this condition can be
substituted by a more general simple condition. The explicit discussion of this condition and
the implications is left for future research.
15Both conditions are required for the existence of a solution of the problem.
16This condition is needed for the threshold curve in ﬁgure 2 to start above the initial
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this model the student will take this random opportunity at T =1-n om a t t e r
what they planned and expected before.
These simple examples also clearly illustrate that education decisions are
timing decisions. Leaving education means taking the opportunity to realize the
returns to education at the right time, even if the opportunity occurs acciden-
tally.
4 Determinants of the expected time to leave
school
In the previous chapter we determined the expected timing of learning and
discussed the implications for academic attainment. In particular, we were
able to show that the dynamic structure of the problem with special regard
to risk and irreversibility is an important ingredient of the decision problem.
In this section we examine the most important and most frequently discussed
determinants of the expected duration of schooling. In particular, we look at the
eﬀects of risk, income dynamics, non-education wage levels, costs of schooling
and the eﬀect of changes in the marginal entry-level wage reward of schooling
and interest rate changes.
Eﬀect of income uncertainty (σ):
Proposition 4 With an increase in risk σ the expected duration of schooling
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Proof. For a proof see Appendix 4.
The inﬂuence of rising risk - measured by the volatility of revenues - on the
time of market entry can be expected and is consistent with Hogan and Walker
(2007), but deviates from the results of Groot and Oosterbeek (1992) and Han-
chane et al.(2006). An increasing income risk will devalue the earning stream
and hence will require higher compensation reﬂected by an increased threshold.
As long as the additional net rewards of longer education can compensate for the
increase in the threshold, schooling will be continued. In ﬁgure 3a the increasing
risk will shift the threshold curve upwards and hence make a later market entry
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Figure 3: Earning proﬁle: Entry-level wage and dynamics of income
explicit evaluation of risk by a utility function (and hence implicitly risk neutral
agents). We do not need to make any assumption about the utility function and
risk aversion. The pure option value and the irreversibility includes the eﬀects
of σi in a diﬀerent way.
Eﬀects of income growth (α)
Proposition 5 W i t ha ni n c r e a s ei nt h eg r o w t hr a t eo ff u t u r ee a r n i n g s ,t h ee x -






















Proof. For a proof see Appendix 5.
Declining general income growth aﬀects the beneﬁts of education. Lower
earnings growth will decrease the expected present value of schooling. Lower
growth and hence less attractive dynamics of the earning track will only pay
oﬀ if entry-level wages increase. This shifts the threshold curve in ﬁgure 3aStay in school or start working? October 6, 2009 16
upwards. With a suﬃcient marginal reward δ the required threshold can still be
reached after more years of schooling. This new earning proﬁle, characterized
by a higher entry-level wage to compensate for less rapid income growth, still
justiﬁes an even longer education.
Eﬀects of an increasing α can also be described by another intuitively plausible
story. If α increases, the expected net value of human capital would increase
as well. As it is now easier to obtain the same value with lower investments,
investments can be reduced.
Eﬀects of the non-education (minimum) wage level (˜ Y (0))
Proposition 6 A rising no-education (minimum) wage level ˜ Y (0) will decrease
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Proof. For a proof see Appendix 6.
The minimum wage level ˜ Y (0) represents the no education wage level when
the schooling decision is made at t =0 . If the agent did not obtain any schooling
they could start working with this entry-level wage ˜ Y (0) (ﬁgure 3b). In case
of an increasing no education wage level educational attainment will decrease.
This ﬁnding is intuitively expected. A rise in ˜ Y (0) indicates (all else being
equal) that no education achieves a higher level in income. The higher the no
education wage path the less attractive a long education and the more attractive
a quick market entry.
Costs of schooling (C)
Proposition 7 With increasing education costs the expected duration of school-



















Proof. For a proof see Appendix 7.
As C denotes the ﬂow of investment costs for schooling, the reaction dT ∗
dC > 0
is not intuitively expected. In the standard approach higher investment expen-
diture would increase the opportunity costs of education and hence would make
education less proﬁtable. As a result educational attainment would be reduced.
Therefore, this result can be regarded as a ”tuition paradox”.Stay in school or start working? October 6, 2009 17
In this approach the decision problem is diﬀerent. As the costs of schooling
increase the student needs compensation from the market to stay in the system.
Therefore, with increasing C, the required threshold shifts upwards in ﬁgure 3a.
As long as the market rewards the outcome of additional schooling suﬃciently
(δ is suﬃciently high), both curves would still intersect at a later time. Even
if the project becomes less proﬁtable overall, the response to increasing costs
will be to choose a higher income path (starting from a higher entry-level wage)
generated by even more education. In other words, the new earning proﬁle
promises a suﬃciently higher earnings path to compensate for the increase in
costs and justify even more education. According to empirical results provided
by Heckman et al. (2008) increasing costs could be partially compensated by
higher investment in schooling and a corresponding rise in entry-level wage.
Higher costs may lead to longer education as long as the rewards are suﬃcient.
However, this is the simplest case discussed in the proposition. The intu-
itively expected outcome of reducing education when costs increase can be also
obtained as soon as the non-linear expansion of the threshold does not allow
for an intersection. If a non-linear threshold is pushed upward as drawn by the
dashed line in ﬁgure 3a, increasing schooling costs cause the student to leave
the education system. The shift in the threshold cannot be matched by a suf-
ﬁcient market reward and we ﬁnd no intersect. For the individual conditions
(costs etc.) of this student, there is no inner solution of the timing problem -
the student will leave school as soon as possible. This is the simplest solution
to the ”tuition paradox”.
Eﬀects of marginal entry-level wage rewards of schooling δ:
Proposition 8 An increase in the marginal entry-level wage reward for a year
of schooling is generally ambiguous. However, an increase in δ will tend to
postpone T∗. It encourages more education if
˜ Y (0)
C becomes suﬃciently large
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Proof. For a proof see Appendix 8.
Looking at condition (22) the sign of the reaction depends on the relative
importance of the two terms, i.e., we can identify two diﬀerent eﬀects. On the
one hand, as education generates an increasing market reward, the entry-level
wage approaches the threshold more quickly [ﬁrst term of (22)].Stay in school or start working? October 6, 2009 18
On the other hand, the threshold itself will be aﬀected. Education time
generates a higher reward and hence schooling duration becomes more valuable
[second term of (22)]. Depending on these two relative eﬀects we obtain a
positive or negative total eﬀect. In proposition (22) we suggest that costs are
relatively high compared to the earning level ˜ Y (0). Hence schooling will be
extended. Further, as the threshold is - amongst other factors - determined by
the evaluation of the education time, we can see how the real option approach
aﬀects the decision.
Eﬀects of the interest rate:
Proposition 9 An increase in the interest rate is generally ambiguous. How-
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Proof. For proof see Appendix 9
As formally discussed in the appendix the reaction is generally ambiguous.
However, we can determine conditions to obtain one or the other reaction.
5F o r m a l q u a l i ﬁcations and option values
"For two reasons, the dynamic nature of schooling suggests that the returns to
education may include an option value. First, the return to one year of school
may include the potential for larger returns associated with higher levels of
education when the returns to school are not constant across all schooling levels.
For example, ﬁnishing high school provides access to college, and attending
college is a necessary ﬁrst step for obtaining a college degree. ... ." [Heckman,
Lochner, and Todd (2006) p. 37].17
Earning proﬁles and formal qualiﬁcation levels
The purpose of this section is to account for discontinuities and non-linearities
in the decision problem. After the general discussion of a timing decision to leave
17The second reason to implment option theory in the human capital decision is already
discussed in the above model: "... Second, when there is uncertainty about college costs or
future earnings and when each additional year of schooling reveals new information about
those costs or earnings, the full returns to schooling will include the expected value of newly
revealed information that can be acted on." [Heckman, Lochner, and Todd (2006) p. 37].Stay in school or start working? October 6, 2009 19
school we now extend the model to include diﬀerent levels of formal qualiﬁcation.
Wages and costs of schooling may not only increase with years of schooling but
also may jump, after attaining a certain education level, to a higher income
stream. The so-called ”sheepskin eﬀect” seems of increasing importance in the
recent empirical discussion. Although one branch of research argues that there
is a linear relationship between wages and years of schooling, recent ﬁndings
support the hypothesis of non-linearities in incomes, which occur especially with
high school and college completion.18 Further, it seems that both the years
of schooling and the achieved level of formal qualiﬁcation determine the two
elements of the earnings proﬁle, namely the entry-level wage when entering
the labor market and the earnings dynamics during working life. Therefore,
the simultaneous consideration of years of schooling and completion of diﬀerent
levels of formal qualiﬁcation is the natural next step in extending the model.
In this extension timing is an optimal choice of a sequence of investments
with varying earning proﬁles connected with the completion of diﬀerent levels
of formal qualiﬁcation. In general the above model can be regarded as a model
for only one level of formal qualiﬁcation. In order to consider more levels we
simply symmetrically add other earning proﬁles to decide on the full set of op-
portunities. Speciﬁcally, for each level of formal qualiﬁcation i (e.g. secondary
education) we assume speciﬁcc o s t sCi for a successful year of schooling ex-
pecting that a speciﬁc earning proﬁle is connected to this formal qualiﬁcation
level. Again, a student observes that for each formal qualiﬁcation level i ay e a r
of additional schooling will increase their entry-level wage ˜ Yi according to the
Brownian motion19
d˜ Yi = δi ˜ Yi + σi˜ YidW for t<T i.
where Ti denotes the years of schooling required to attain the formal qual-
iﬁcation level i (e.g in many secondary education programs students have to
study four years, hence Ti =4 ). Further, the dynamic development of income Yi
during working life for each level of formal qualiﬁcation i is once again described
by20
dYi = αiYidt + σiYidW for Ti <t .
It now becomes apparent that the individual earning proﬁles associated with
diﬀerent levels of formal qualiﬁcation may be characterized by diﬀerent marginal
rewards in entry-level wages (δi), diﬀerent growth patterns (αi) and diﬀerent
risks (σi).
In ﬁgure 4 we describe an example of three levels of formal qualiﬁcation (pri-
mary, secondary and tertiary education, i =1 ,2,3) to illustrate the additional
18See e.g. Heckman (1995); Heckman, Lochner, and Todd (2006, 2008); Denny, Harmon
(2001); Skalli (2007); Ferrer, Riddell (2008); Silles (2008).
19Each level of formal qualiﬁcation is modeled symmetrically to the reference model above.
Therefore see also (2) for only one level of formal qualiﬁcation.
20See again (3).Stay in school or start working? October 6, 2009 20
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Figure 4: Earning proﬁl e sf o rv a r i o u sl e v e l so ff o r m a lq u a l i ﬁcation
eﬀects of completing of various qualiﬁcation levels. Figure 4 describes various
proﬁles for various years of schooling and levels of formal qualiﬁcation. When
as p e c i ﬁcn u m b e ro fy e a r sTi is reached the student attains a formal qualiﬁca-
tion i (e.g. secondary education). In this diagram for a higher level of formal
qualiﬁcation we assume a smaller δi and an larger αi.A s a r e s u l t , s t u d e n t s
studying at e.g. secondary level are rewarded for additional schooling with a
relatively strong boost in entry-level wages, but will also expect relatively low
income dynamics. However, other patterns are possible.
As in the previous chapter we can now take the entry-level wage curve ˜ Yi(T),
determine the threshold curve Y ∗
i (T)21 and derive the expected time of schooling
for each level of qualiﬁcation T∗
i . For our example involving three levels of formal
qualiﬁcation ﬁgure 5a gives the results in the V,F − T plane. When education
starts, a student will make a decision concerning the anticipated duration of
schooling and the corresponding formal academic qualiﬁcation. Their plan uses
available information and takes into account potential irreversibility.
Figure 5a exhibits three proﬁles of net value of human capital (net wealth
of education) Vi (i =1 ,2,3 see (6)) and the corresponding option value, one
21To keep the discussion simple at this point, we do not explicitly consider the option value
of a total sequence, such that the completion of one level of formal qualiﬁcation is required
to start the next. This extension would increase the option value. For the discussion of the
additional option value of completing a formal qualiﬁcation see the discussion at the end of
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for each level of formal qualiﬁcation. At each moment a student will compare
the net value of human capital when starting work straight away Vi(T),w i t h
the value of the option of staying in school and obtaining more education Fi(T)
(see (7)). As long as the option value is higher than the net value of human
capital the student will defer their decision to enter the labor market. Waiting
and completing more years of schooling is the dominant strategy. In ﬁgure 5a
we can follow this consideration from the start. If V1 <F 1 the student will defer
entering the labor market. They will do so until point A is reached. At point
A the value matching condition (9) and smooth pasting condition (10) simulta-
neously hold and an optimum is reached. If there are no other alternatives, A
would be the expected duration of schooling at primary level. However, there
are alternatives. The student could ﬁnish primary education and then opt for
additional schooling at secondary level. As the value of a completed primary
education and some secondary-level schooling (F2) is higher than V1 at point
A the student will complete primary education and enter secondary education.
For this higher, secondary education level they go through the same consider-
ations as before. Comparing the value of entering the labor market with the
option values of additional education and the attendant opportunities, they will
opt for additional years of schooling in the example of ﬁgure 5a. The expected
time of schooling T∗ is reached once they have gained a formal tertiary qualiﬁ-
cation plus some additional schooling time. Since for each formal qualiﬁcation
the timing of leaving school and entering the labor market can be determined, it
is easy to pick the optimal point according to the decision rule. G is the stable
optimal solution to this dynamic decision problem, which includes irreversibility
and uncertainties.
Moreover, as the formal qualiﬁcation i =3(tertiary education) is reached at
T = Ti=3 and T∗ >T i=3 the student decides to have more than the minimum
years of schooling required to complete tertiary education. If θ = T∗ − Ti > 0
are the additional years of schooling beyond the formal minimum requirement,
why these extra years of education? In real life we ﬁnd many education activ-
ities that are not directly connected to a formal qualiﬁcation. Internships, a
language course abroad, time spent on searching for a job and collecting infor-
mation and even time spent on developing one’s personal proﬁle can extend a
students’s duration of education beyond the minimum required for a given for-
mal qualiﬁcation. Therefore, these additional years are part of the value of the
waiting option after formal education has been obtained. The additional years
θ do not necessarily take place after a formal education has ended; they can,
and in fact normally do, take place at any time during the formal education
program.
We can also think of other examples especially at tertiary level when an extra
year may be completed during the oﬃcial term of study. At universities many
students take a sabbatical from their home program. In this case the extra year
is taken before formal graduation. The extra year will extend the time until the
formal qualiﬁcation is completed. In this case working life still starts straight
after graduation, which seems to be the normal pattern. Therefore, equation
(15) is the number of school years including those elements that are not formallyStay in school or start working? October 6, 2009 22
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Figure 5: Sequence of formal qualiﬁcation levels
required for formal qualiﬁcation at secondary level.
Option value of completing a formal qualiﬁcation Regarding a sequence
of formal qualiﬁcation levels another important phenomenon can be integrated
into this approach concerning schooling decision under uncertainty. Often the
entry into a higher education program requires the prior successful completion
of a lower qualiﬁcation level. E.g. if a student wants to start a college degree,
they need to graduate from high school beforehand. From the perspective of
a sequential decision the option value of an education is not only described
by the earning proﬁle of the education level in question, but also includes the
option value of completing a higher qualiﬁcation later on. In other words, when
the student considers the option value of completing of secondary education
F2, and completing secondary education is a prerequisite for tertiary education,
they consider the potential income stream for this qualiﬁcation as well as for
the option of this qualiﬁcation but also for the option of tertiary education F3.
"Our ﬁndings suggest that part of the economic return to ﬁnishing high school
or attending college includes the potential for completing college and securing
the high rewards associated with a college degree. Both sequential resolution of
uncertainty and non-linearity in returns to schooling can contribute to sizeable
option values." [Heckman, Lochner, and Todd, (2006) p. 7].
Hence the option value of secondary education includes an income compo-
nent connected to secondary education, and the option value of starting tertiaryStay in school or start working? October 6, 2009 23
education, F2 = F2(F3,V 2). While the option value of tertiary education can

















the decision on the duration of secondary education will include this option
value in the boundary conditions:
F2 (0) = 0
F2(Y ∗
2 )=F3(Y ∗








As can be derived from these conditions, this additional option value will
push up the threshold and increase the expected duration of schooling at sec-
ondary level.
However, as mentioned before (ﬁgure 2) this menu of choices reﬂects long
term expectations regarding years of schooling and completing formal education,
yet the future is uncertain. Therefore, this plan is valid only under the present
conditions of period t =0 . It is a preliminary plan which needs to be revised
permanently. One period later the optimal plan and the marginal decision to
wait or start working is adjusted to account for new information and conditions.
The sequence of marginal decisions terminates when the decision to switch is
made. Then the earnings track has been chosen irreversibly. In other words,
even if the plan suggests that schooling should be expected to be terminated
after three years (e.g. after tertiary education is completed), a sudden change
in conditions can terminate schooling overnight, leading to an unexpected entry
into working life.
6 Summary
The major purpose of this paper is to derive a timing rule for leaving school and
entering the labor market. Thus, we answer the question: How long should one
go to school? Considering uncertainty of future developments we use real op-
tion theory in terms of a dynamic programming model. Schooling expenditure,
earning streams and the option values of remaining in education determine the
expected time to leave school and one’s academic achievement. In addition to
the recent literature our approach includes continuous schooling costs that de-
pend on individual abilities and qualiﬁcation programs. Education attainment
generates diﬀe r i n ge xa n t ei n c o m ep r o ﬁles each consisting of a) an uncertain
22For further information see Appendix 1b).Stay in school or start working? October 6, 2009 24
movement of entry-level wages during one’s education time, and b) the uncer-
tain dynamics of the earning proﬁle once working life has started. Both compo-
nents can reﬂect rewards for education and can both be described by a speciﬁc
Brownian motion. At all times an individual can decide sequentially to remain
in school or leave the education system and start working. However, once the
decision to leave the education system is made, the decision is irreversible. As
the individual has expectations regarding the ﬁrst-time realization of stochas-
tically moving entry-level wages and can determine the optimal threshold, the
expected duration of schooling can be identiﬁed. While the existing literature
discusses pure threshold reactions for e.g. taxes and uncertainty, we explicitly
determine the expected timing of market entry (ﬁrst passage time). This allows
an analysis of the eﬀects of current market conditons and illustrates that the
human capital decision is a sequential decision in time. Comparative statics for
all relevant variables are discussed fully analytically. No numerical discussion
is needed. E.g. increasing education costs (or increasing risk) may increase
human capital investments as long as the marginal reward for another year of
schooling is suﬃciently high and hence additional costs (or risk) are suﬃciently
compensated by income. However, if costs become too high there is no inner
solution and the education process terminates. Further, as we are able to look
at a sequence of education programs, each characterized by various cost and
income proﬁles of formal qualiﬁcation levels, discontinuities and sheepskin ef-
fects can be analyzed. As entry into a higher education program often requires
the prior successful completion of a lower qualiﬁcation level, the option value of
an education is not only described by the earning proﬁle of the education level
in question, but also should include the option value of completing a higher
qualiﬁcation later on. This problem is discussed in the ﬁnal section.
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7A p p e n d i x
7.1 Appendix 1: Net present and option value
7.1.1 a) Proof of Proposition 1 and Derivatives of λ
The value of the earnings stream is determined by







For the option values F the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation for the Brown-
















σ2 ˜ Y 2 ∂F







σ2 ˜ Y 2 ∂F
∂ ˜ Y 2 − rF =0
This is a second-order homogenous ordinary diﬀerential equation with a free
boundary.










solves the homogenous diﬀerential equation.
δ˜ YBλ˜ Y λ−1 +
1
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σ2 > 1 see (12)
with δ<r see (13)Stay in school or start working? October 6, 2009 28
As ˜ Y goes to zero, F tends to 0. This implies that the negative root of the
characteristic polynomial should have no inﬂuence on F as ˜ Y tends to zero.
































































































At the investment trigger point Y ∗ the value of the option must equal the
net value obtained by exercising it (value of the active project minus sunk cost
of the investment). Hence the following must hold:





















Besides for I(T) > 0 we have to assume that ¯ C>C
r .
The smooth-pasting condition require st h a tt h et w ov a l u ef u n c t i o n sm e e t
tangentially:
(F(Y ∗))0 =( V gross(Y ∗))0
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7.1.2 b) Option value for diﬀerent income levels
According to Dixit, Pindyck (1994, ch. 10) investment decisions can be made
sequentially, for example for three diﬀerent levels of income.
We compute the option value F3 corresponding to the entry-level wage path
˜ Y3. From the value matching condition we obtain























r (erT − 1) + ¯ C
¤λ3−1Stay in school or start working? October 6, 2009 30





















7.2 Appendix 2: Deriving T and Proof of Proposition 2
a) Development of entry-level wages: Expected Path of Entry-level Wages:
The development of the entry-level wages upon market entry is determined by
d˜ Y = δ˜ Y + σ˜ Yd W
We put g(x)=l o gx to get the Ito formula for log ˜ Y (t):




We obtain after integration














˜ Y (T)=˜ Y (0)e((δ− 1
2σ2)T+σW(T)) and hence
E ˜ Y (T)=˜ Y (0)eδT.
∂E˜ Y (T)
∂T
= δ˜ Y (0)eδT
and lnE ˜ Y (T) is a linear function in T:
lnE ˜ Y (T)=l n˜ Y (0) + δT
Expected First Time Realization of Entry-level Wages: We can determine
the expected time E(˜ Ti) needed to reach a certain income level ˜ Yi for the ﬁrst
time given the present value ˜ Y (0). By using the Girsanov theorem we can derive
the probability density function of ˜ Ti
23 given by


















2 σ2) ˜ Ti
2
2σ2 ˜ Ti
23An extensive discussion is oﬀered by Karatzas and Shreve (1991, p.196), and by Karlin
and Taylor (1975, p.363).Stay in school or start working? October 6, 2009 31






























For each ˜ Yi we can determine each expected time E(˜ Ti) when this entry-
level wage ˜ Yi is reached for the ﬁrst time. Hence for a continuous variation of








Later we want to discuss the existence of the expected time T∗ of market en-
try for the threshold Y ∗(T) (ﬁrst passage time for the threshold Y ∗ (see 11)).
Therefore, for each existing E ˜ T = T we rewrite (14) as a cotinous function f of
time T
˜ Y = ˜ Y0eT(δ− 1
2σ
2) =: f(T).
lnf(T) is a linear function in T :




7.3 Appendix 3: Existence of a solution for the expected
time T∗ of market entry, and determination of T∗ as
an implicit function/Proof of Proposition 3:
In general we look for the conditions described in ﬁgure 6. The threshold starts
above the entry-level wage curve. For positive T the threshold will have an
unique intersection with the expected ﬁrst-time realization of the entry-level
wage curve from below at A. Hence at the time of expected market entry
denoted by T∗ G = Y ∗(T) − f(T)=0and the G curve has a negative slope
dG
dT < 0.







ln ( ) fT











Figure 6: Intersection of the threshold and expected ﬁrst-time realization of
initial income value function, and distance function G.
Further, at T∗ the threshold Y ∗(T =0 )must start above f(T), and G>0
during the pre-market entry period (0 <t<T ∗). Otherwise the market entry
would have taken place.
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2σ2 < ¯ C ⇔ C<(δ −
1
2
σ2) ¯ C<r¯ Cs e e17
Before market entry f(T∗) must grow faster than the threshold curve. Only
for a negative slope G can approach and eventually reach zero. ∂G
∂T < 0 is
fulﬁlled if condition ¯ C>C
r (condition 17)
7.3.2 Existence of an intersect of Y ∗(T∗) and f(T∗) for positive T∗ :
a) As the function lnY ∗(T) is convex if condition (17) holds (see 24) and the
function lnf(T) is linear, there are at most two intersections. We are interested
only in intersections at T>0. An intersection for positive values of both
functions exists if condition (16) and (17) holds and G =0for positive values
of T∗.
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(r−α) ˜ Y (0)
see (16)
The last inequality is a condition for the axis intercepts of Y ∗and f(T). It
guarantees that f(T) has a lower value in T =0than Y ∗.
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b) Further, in ﬁgure 6 the condition for an intersection and a negative slope
has to hold simultaneously at T ∗. We need to show that there is a T∗ were both
dG
dT < 0 and G =0hold. That is, we can ﬁnd a minimum level for ˜ Y (0) in order
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Finally, ˜ Y (0) has to lie in the open interval
⎛
⎜
⎝ ¯ C λ




2 σ2 − C
r
− C








7.3.3 c) T∗ as an implicit function of various variables/Proof of
Propositon 3:
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 : If
(i) condition (16) holds,
(ii) the derivative ∂G
∂T (α,r,σ,T∗,C,˜ Y (0),δ, ¯ C) is negative (see condition (??))
for each vector (α,r,σ,T ∗,C,˜ Y (0),δ, ¯ C) and
(iii) the partial derivatives of G by of α,σ,C, ˜ Y (0),δ, ¯ C and r are continuous
(vide infra), we can apply the implicit function theorem. Hence for a marginal
environment of any vector (α,r,σ,T∗,C,˜ Y (0),δ, ¯ C),T ∗ is an implicit function
of of α,σ,C, ˜ Y (0),δ, ¯ C and r. q.e.d.Stay in school or start working? October 6, 2009 35
T∗ = T∗(α,σ,C, ˜ Y (0),δ,r, ¯ C)
















































































7.4 Appendix 4: Proof of Proposition 4
To apply comparative statics for the implicit function T∗ = T∗(α,σ,C, ˜ Y (0),δ r)






(r − α)CerT − (δ −
1
2
σ2)˜ Y (0)e(δ− 1
2σ2)T T 0
We are only interested in values of T∗, described by point A in ﬁgure 6
,conditions (16) and ∂G
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(r − α)Ce(r−δ+ 1





<0 see (?? and 17)
< 0






















<0 see (?? and 17)
C
> 0
7.8 Appendix 8: Proof of Proposition 8
For the derivative with respect to δ and r we need an approximation of I(T) to
examine the sign. We approximate I(T) for the time range between 0 and the
point T∗ by a log linear function with the parameter β denoting the average
growth rate of total accumulated costs between 0 and T∗. Economically, this
simpliﬁcation describes a approximation where total costs are payable only at
the end of the education period. The non-log linear path of cost accumulation
is proximated as a continous geometric growth process. Therefore we introduce








Note that we approximate a non-linear function (I) with a non-linear growth
rate through a log-linear function which has the same unique positive intersec-
tion with the logarithmized income threshold curve. We consider the shape of










r ¯ C − C
¢
(C















T=0 =l n¯ C =l nI(0).
As both curves intersect in T = T∗ we can determine a β that satisﬁes the


























As Y ∗(0) > ˜ Y (0) and ln( ¯ CeβT∗
) and lnI(T) s t a r ta tt h es a m ep o i n t ,t h e




σ2 − β>0 (25)




(r − α) ¯ CeβT∗
− ˜ Y (0)e(δ− 1
2σ2)T ∗
=0














































Similar to the derivative of T∗ with respect to r we have to examine under
which condition which summand prevails. Here we assume that the eﬀect of the
option value is dominant.























































To ﬁnd out if X T 0 we need to follow three steps:
1) Assume a suﬃcient condition for X>0 and X<0: From our
knowledge of the system we assume a suﬃcient condition for an unambigious
sign. It is supposed that
3
8σ2 + 3
2δ>r implies X>0. (26)
3
8σ2 + 3
2δ<r implies X<0. (27)
2) Show that conditions (26) and (27) hold: We now show that (26) and
(27) are suﬃcient conditions for obtaining an unambiguous sign for X:
a) From (26) we obtain λ<3/2 a n df r o m( 2 7 )w eo b t a i nλ>




































































































we proved that the value of λ depends on
conditions (26) and (27). Therefore we obtain
3
2 >λ for 3
4σ2 +3 δ>2r (28)
3
2 <λ for 3
4σ2 +3 δ<2r (29)



















































































From conditions (29) and (28) we know 3
2 >λ for 3
4σ2 +3 δ>2r and
3
2 <λ for 3
4σ2 +3 δ<2r . Therefore we can examine whether we ﬁnd true
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As we can see, there is a feasible combination of δ,σ2, and α that satisﬁes
this condition. The assumption that X>0 and X<0 is proven under the
derived conditions (26) and (27).CESifo Working Paper Series 
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